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INTRODUCTION

In its primitive stages, the injunction was chancery's device for avoiding the threat or continuance of an irreparableinjury to land. As time went
on, it was found serviceablefor other, newly acquiredconcerns of a growingly
heterogeneous society. But legal traditionfosters the illusion that law always
was what it has come to be. And so, the chancellor brought under the concept
of property whatever interests he protected. Modern issues due to new complexities are thus smothered beneath the delusive simplicity of old terms.1
Growing governmental power and increasing administrative activity
mean that judicial review will need to develop, not that it should be restricted. Those who now clamorfor more restrictedjudicial review may be
t

B.A., Amherst College, 1999; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2005. The author expresses

gratitude to Professors Kevin Clermont and Trevor Morrison and to David Moeller, formerly of Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc.
1 FELJx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 47 (1930) (footnote
omitted).
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defending the fort and losing the country. The battleground of judicial review is already changingfrom the field of legislation to that of administration, and lawyers, judges, and political scientists should realize it if they do
2
not do so now.

The above quotations present the two ideas that form the outermost intellectual boundaries of this Note. The first eloquently
presents the problem of "reckoning" endemic to the common-law system. That is, judges are forced to fictionalize legal terms to allow the
law to account for the changing society that it purports to organize
and control. As a consequence, in order to crawl out from under "the
delusive simplicity" of time-bound language, legal writers must periodically force the judicial system to account for changes that have already taken place. Once out in the open, these changes may be
analyzed for what they are, and informed decisions can be made as to
whether they are truly desirable.
The second quotation suggests the need for the judiciary itself to
change. Accounting for changes in terminology and legal device is
useful only insofar as the judiciary's understanding of its place in the
governmental structure is current. That is, legal device and the role
of the judiciary are distinct but interwoven, operating in a constantly
changing conceptual framework. An account of the changes to one is
incomplete without an account of the changes to the other.
The subject of this Note is the administrative injunction, an order
issued by a lower federal court 3 against a federal agency, 4 which purports to provide class-wide relief in the absence of a certified class. 5
What is troubling about these administrative injunctions is their legislative feel; administrative injunctions in non-class actions purport to
benefit entire classes of similarly situated parties extending well beyond the named plaintiffs. 6 Many of the opinions ordering these

2

-

P. FIELD, THE EFFECT-OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 326 (1935).
All of the cases with which this Note is concerned involve the use of injunctions by
OLIVER

lower federal courts. Injunctions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and by state courts

raise a host of issues that are beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the importance of distinguishing between lower federal courts and the Supreme Court when analyz-

ing the scope of injunctions, see infra Part II.
4 Again, this Note will not address the many issues that arise when federal courts
issue injunctions against state governments. Much of the literature addressing that topic is

concerned with the civil rights era. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see generally
Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976);
Frank M. Johnson, The Constitution and the FederalDistrictJudge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1976);

Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REv. 661 (1978).
5

See, e.g, Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1987).

6 See, e.g., Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D.S.D.
2002). This case is discussed in greater detail below.
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broad injunctions entirely fail to discuss scope.7 Those opinions that
do discuss the scope of these administrative injunctions often appear
to do so as an afterthought, citing few cases and offering only conclusory justifications.8
The lower federal courts advance little explanation for these
broad mandates. There is, in fact, little law to apply that is directly on
point. The role of the injunction has changed greatly since the framing of the U.S. Constitution, and much of the change has been incremental and ad hoc. 9 Furthermore, equitable remedies came into
being because of a need for flexibility in the law,1 0 and thus courts
may be less concerned with providing justification when the remedies
are equitable. Also, because the injunction is a highly varied genus of
remedy, and because injunctions have been employed as a remedy in
so many different situations, it is difficult to extract general rules of
usage from the mass of cases.
Nonetheless, a reader of these cases might be struck by an odd
ambivalence. On the one hand, these injunctions have a visceral appeal; it seems that an unconstitutional administrative regulation
should be unenforceable against any person protected by the Constitution, regardless of geography or the incidents of an adversarial system. On the other hand, these injunctions have a legislative quality
that at its best suggests some degree of judicial usurpation, and at its
worst is flagrantly violative of American constitutional principles. The
true state of affairs probably lies somewhere between these positions,
yet the debate over the propriety of the administrative injunction generally takes place at the ideological extremes. Thus, there is a need to
step back and assess the current state of the administrative injunction
without falling into the stridency of either ideological commitment.

7
See, e.g., N.Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002),
rev'd on other grounds, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
8 See, e.g., Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
In that case, the court stated: "The INS asserts that in the absence of class certification, the
preliminary injunction may properly cover only the named plaintiffs. We agree." Id. at
1371. The court cited three cases that were not directly on point and made no attempt to
point out several crucial distinctions between the instant case and those cited. See id.; see
also Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1205 n.31 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(confining the court's entire discussion of the scope of the injunction to a final footnote).
9 See generally OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (arguing that the
institutional reform litigation of the civil rights era spawned a new breed of injunction);
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1 (discussing developments in the use of injunctions in
American law, specifically during the era of labor movements).
10 See F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 6 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1920); H.
ARTHUR SMITH, A PRAcrlc.I
EXPOsITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 8 (3d ed. 1902)
(describing equity as "dealing . .. with the exceptional and the abnormal, and being less
capable of exact definition, because it is ever adapting itself to the various devices and the
various needs of human nature").
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A look at two recent cases in which such injunctions have been
ordered will highlight the issues that will be discussed in depth below.
The first of these cases, Livestock Marketing Association v. United States
Department of Agriculture' (LMA), involved a challenge to an assessment program run by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). This program, called the "beef checkoff,"1 2 was established
by the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 198513 and implemented
by the USDA to fund a program of research and generic advertising
for the purpose of promoting the domestic beef industry. 4 The District Court of South Dakota eventually ruled the program unconstitutional on the ground that the generic advertising campaign amounted
to compelled speech, and that, as such, it violated the First Amendment rights of cattle producers.' 5 The district court enjoined the Department of Agriculture from enforcing any provision of the Beef Act
as to any beef producer nationwide. 16 The court explicitly denied the
government's request to limit the holding to the named plaintiffs, stating: "To so limit the holding would only encourage numerous other
producers, importers, and other sellers of beef on the hoof to file additional lawsuits in this and other federal jurisdictions."'17 This deci8
sion was affirmed on appeal in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
The Eighth Circuit dedicated only two sentences to the scope of the
injunction, saying that the "district court did not abuse its discretion
in fashioning its relief" and that "our holding that the Beef Act is unconstitutional is not limited solely to the plaintiffs in the present
case." 19
A second recent case involving the use of an administrative injunction is Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.29 This case also involved a First Amendment challenge, focusing
11 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D.S.D. 2002). This decision is actually the second under this
name, the first having resulted in a preliminary injunction for the plaintiffs. See Livestock
Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 132 F. Supp. 2d 817 (D.S.D. 2001). Shortly after that
decision, the Supreme Court struck down a similar government checkoff program on
broader First Amendment grounds in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
The plaintiffs in LMA were subsequently granted leave by the district court to amend their
complaint to include the grounds upon which United Foods was decided. See Livestock Mktg.
Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
12
This program is called the "beef checkoff" because a beef producer must prove that
she has paid the assessments before the USDA will certify, or "check off," her beef.
13
Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1601, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911
(2004)).
14 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1260.101-1269.217 (2004).
15 See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
See id. at 1007-08.
16
17
Id. at 1007.
18
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 772 (8th Cir. 2003).
19

Id.

283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th
Cir. 2004).
20
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on the constitutionality of the so-called do-not-call list. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) created the list pursuant to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,2 which granted
the Commission authority to "prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive
telemarketing acts or practices." 22 After promulgation of the
Telemarketing Sales Rules,2 3 which established the "do-not-call" registry, two telemarketing companies and a professional association challenged the Rules in the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief,24 claiming that the do-not-call list
represented a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the
First Amendment.2 5 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and
permanently enjoined the FTC from enforcing the do-not-call list
26
against any telemarketer nationwide.
Other recent cases contain similar decrees, 2 7 raising issues about
the propriety of lower federal courts granting class-wide relief in nonclass actions. While no blanket rule could adequately address the various issues that arise in these cases, some sort of analytical structure
might be valuable to future litigants and lawmakers. Certain questions surface and resurface in these cases: Who in the class of beneficiaries may enforce these broad injunctions? Is it appropriate for
lower federal courts to foreclose litigation of important policy issues in
other circuits? Is nationwide uniformity2 8 or individualized justice the
goal of public litigation?
The answer to these questions is: it depends. The propriety of
these injunctions is dependent upon the facts of the particular case.
Broad injunctions appropriate to remedying First Amendment violations may be overbroad in remedying specific due process violations,
yet the cases are cited interchangeably as if such injunctions apply
seamlessly across substantive boundaries. In general, the courts
should be aware of the nature of the rights being remedied, the nature of the violation being enjoined, the nationwide policy concerns
21
22

Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2004)).
15 U.S.C. § 6102 (2004).

23

16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3-310.4 (2003).

24
25

See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
See id. at 1159.
See id. at 1168. The Tenth Circuit, however, later reversed this decision and upheld

26

the do-not-call list. See 358 F.3d 1228 (2004).

27

See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (D.NJ.

2002) (enjoining implementation of an administrative directive that would have applied to
any media group nationwide), rev'd on other grounds, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); see also
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2004) (issuing a permanent injunction
enjoining the Department of Defense from inoculating employees with the anthrax vaccine without the employees' consent).
28
Cf United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 236 (1927) (stating that

collateral estoppel does not apply where inconsistent judgments "would lead to inequality
in the administration of the customs law").
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of federal agencies and the federal judiciary, and the contours of the
potential class of beneficiaries. Courts should also consider ethical
issues in cases of informal class-wide representation.2 9 Nevertheless,
the courts often fail to address these issues in a coherent fashion.
Part I of this Note will trace the development of the use of the
injunction in the federal courts, from its roots in the English courts of
equity, through the American labor and civil rights movements, to the
current role of the injunction in the modern regulatory state. Part II
will discuss the ongoing debates in the federal courts over the propriety of these injunctions, with particular attention paid to the few Supreme Court cases that offer some guiding principles and the lower
court cases that attempt to bring order to this disorderly field. Because the courts that discuss the scope of these injunctions cite few
cases and often contain only conclusory explanations, Part III is an
attempt to sort out the various principles informing these decisions.
I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE INJUNCTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This Part is not meant to present a comprehensive history of equity in general or injunctions in particular. Many imposing volumes
accomplish that task well. 30 Instead, this Part hopes to accomplish,
through this brief history, three separate-but-related tasks. First, as
the injunction is an equitable remedy, in order to understand the current state of injunctions one must understand at least something of its
ancient roots. 3 1 Thus, this Part maps out the history of injunctions
from its English origins to the present day. Second, this Part hopes to
isolate certain concepts encoded in the very nature of equity jurisprudence that continue to express themselves in current judicial
opinions. The qualities that continue to play a role in the
use of injunctions are flexibility, 32 prospectivity, 33 and individua29
See generally Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519 (suggesting that situations of non-class collective representation leave lawyers uncertain about
whether they owe their loyalty to an individual client or to the larger collective).
30 The principal works that I relied on in researching equity and injunctions are the
following: OWEN M. Fiss & Douc RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984); MAITLAND, supra
note 10; THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1956);
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES (1905); ED-

WARD D. RE &JOSEPH R. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES (4th ed. 1996); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE (A. E. Randall ed., 3d ed. 1920); Walter

Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 37 (1915); Thomas 0.
Main, TraditionalEquity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REv. 429 (2003).
31
See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 2 ("[F]or the mere purpose of understanding the
present state of our law, some history becomes necessary.").
32 See id. at 4-6, 8-9, 254.
33
See id. at 254-56, 259; 1 JAMES L. HIoH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 3,

38-39 (Shirley T. High ed., 4th ed. 1905); Chayes, supra note 4, at 1292-95 (noting that
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tion. 34 Understanding these qualities is the key to understanding
both the troubling and the beneficial aspects of the administrative injunction. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a look at the history
of the injunction in the American legal system shows that the current
use of the administrative injunction was inevitable. 35 This Note attempts to accept this inevitability and move past it, illuminating the
various problems and advantages inherent in the use of the administrative injunction and establishing a coherent method for analyzing
them.
A.

English Roots

The notion of equity as a necessary component of justice long
predates the Anglo-American legal system.3 6 The seeds of the equity
jurisprudence that still survive in American law were sown in England
during the reign of Edward I as a means of circumventing the notorious rigidity of the common-law courts.3 7 The courts of equity
originated in the administrative office of the Chancery, which was
headed by the Chancellor. 38 Generally, the Chancellor was a bishop
in the Catholic Church and the king's closest advisor. 39 The duties of
the courts of equity were originally interstitial. 40 That is, in the beginning the Chancery did not offer direct relief, but instead would issue
new writs to be taken to the courts of law. 41 The writ system of the

common-law courts was intended to foster form and predictability, but
the consequent procedural rigidity also tended to work injustice in
certain individual cases. 42 Parties who believed they were wronged,
but who had no recourse in the courts of law,4 3 originally applied to
"the prospective character of [injunctions] introduces large elements of contingency and
prediction into the proceedings").
34 See SMITH, supra note 10, at 8 (describing equity's flexibility as "ever adapting itself
to the various devices and the various needs of human nature").
35
See, e.g., FRAN-KFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 52 ("In truth, the extraordinary
remedy of injunction has become the ordinary legal remedy, almost the sole remedy."); see
also Fiss, supra note 9, at 1-6 (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education should be appreciated as liberating the injunction from control of hand-wringing traditionalists).
36
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford Press
2002); STORY, supra note 30, at 1-4 (discussing notions of equity in ancient Roman law).
37
See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 2-6.
38
Id. at 2.
39
See id. at 2-3. Maitland notes that early courts of equity borrowed much procedurally from the ecclesiastical courts, which is perhaps a result of this longstanding connection
between church and chancery. See id. at 5.
40
See STORY, supra note 30, at 24 ("[E]quitable jurisdiction ... was principally applied
to remedy defects in the common-law proceedings[ ].
).
41
See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 3.
42
See STORY, supra note 30, at 16-17.
43
See MAITLAND, supranote 10, at 6. Parties seeking relief in the courts of equity were
generally unable to attain redress in the courts of law either because the writ system did
not recognize the particular wrong or because the party was seeking relief against a power-
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the king for relief.44 The king would in turn refer the requests to the
Chancellor. 45 Over time, supplicants in need began to apply directly
to the Chancellor, 46 and eventually " [t] he Chancellor unrolled a vast
body of legal principle that we know as 'equity' to offer relief in those
cases where, because of the technicality of procedure, defective methods of proof, and other shortcomings in the common law, there was
47
no 'plain, adequate and complete' remedy otherwise available."
Two types of relief were available from the Chancellor: a new writ
or direct relief.48 The Chancellor might invent a new writ as a way of
'49
meeting new substantive issues not covered by the "writs of course.
The common-law courts were hostile to these new writs as being extrajudicial, and the courts often quashed them before relief could be
granted. 50 However, because the law was seen as deriving from the
inherent power of the king, 5 1 the Chancellor, as empowered by the
king, could also issue direct orders granting relief where there was no
remedy at law. 52 It is through this system of orders that the Chancery,
which began as an essentially administrative body, became part of the
English judiciary.
As the Chancery's role expanded, Parliament became displeased
with the free-ranging, flexible nature of the courts of equity. 53 Despite Parliament's disapproval, however, the courts of equity began to
play an indispensable role in certain substantive areas of law.54 In particular, the courts of equity were well-suited for enforcing fiduciary
obligations of trusts. 55 Eventually, the flexibility that justified and solidified the place of equity within the law lent itself to other pursuits:
remedying fraud, canceling and rectifying agreements, quieting title,
ordering specific performance of a contract, and issuing injunctions
ful nobleman who would have undue influence over the actions of the local courts. See
Main, supra note 30, at 440-41.
44
See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 3.
45
See id. at 5.
46
See id.
47
'See Main, supra note 30, at 441-42.
48
See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 3.
49
50
51
52

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.at 3-4.
id.

53 See id. at 6.
54 See id. at 7 (noting the development of the Chancellor's authority to "enforce uses,
trusts or confidences").
55 See id. As Maidand explained:
A system of law which will never compel, which will never even allow, the
defendant to give evidence, a system which sends every question of fact to a
jury, is not competent to deal adequately with fiduciary relationships. On
the other hand the Chancellor had a procedure which was very well
adapted to this end.
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to remedy ongoing or threatened property violations. 56 In these areas, equity was traditionally seen as supporting and completing, but
57
never replacing, the common law.
Over time, due to an ever-increasing caseload and an expanding
role for the courts of equity, equitable procedures and remedies became standardized. 58 The injunction was but one of the so-called equitable remedies, though an important one. More flexible and more
widely applicable than the other equitable remedies, the injunction
developed into an extremely powerful tool in the hands of the courts
of equity. 59
An injunction can be either prohibitory or mandatory.6 0 In general, a prohibitory injunction is an "order made by the Court forbidding a person or class of persons from doing a certain act, or acts of a
certain class, upon pain of going to prison for an indefinite time as
contemnors of the Court."6 1 In its early stages, courts used prohibitory injunctions to halt ongoing trespass, to prevent waste, to restrain
alienation of certain property, and to abate nuisance. 62 A mandatory
injunction is an affirmative order requiring a person to remedy a
wrongful, existing state of affairs. 63 Courts most commonly used the
mandatory injunction in actions to quiet title, 64 to enforce covenants, 6 5 and to remove obstructions interfering with another's property rights. 66 Of course, this list is not nearly exhaustive; indeed, as an
equitable remedy, the injunction is intended for adaptation to a vari67
ety of purposes.
Because of their flexibility, a certain level of generality is required
when defining the use of injunctions. While most of the equitable
remedies deal with specific substantive areas-e.g., specific property
arrangements such as mortgages and trusts, or specific wrongs such as
fraud and accident-injunctions operate in personam, transcend substantive boundaries, and can be directed toward a wide variety of be56

See id. at 20-21;

STORY,

supra note 30, at 17-20, 32-34.

See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 18-19 (emphasizing that "[w]e ought not to think
of common law and equity as of two rival systems," for equity has always "presupposed the
existence of common law").
See id. at 10-11.
58
59 See id. at 254.
60 See id. at 256-57. This difference will prove to be analytically important as the use
of the injunction increases over time.
61
Id. at 254.
62
See id. at 254-55 (providing examples of language that judges might include in
such prohibitory injunctions).
63
Id. at 257.
64
See id. at 260.
65 See id. at 263.
66
See id. at 257.
67
See STORY, supra note 30, at 367.
57
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haviors. 68 Among other functions, injunctions were used to declare
rights in order to prevent irreparable harm to property interests 69 and
70
to eliminate the need for (or threat of) repetitive litigation. While it
is now generally accepted that irreparable harm is no longer a requirement for the issuance of an injunction, 7' the prevention of repetitious litigation is still commonly cited as a justification for injunctive
72
relief.
B.

The American Developments

While some of the original thirteen colonies created separate
courts of equity and others created courts of combined jurisdiction,
73
all of the American colonies had some working system of equity.
Though the Constitution officially and permanently transplanted equity into the new American constitutional democracy, the new states
generally "administered only a rough layman's equity."7 4 By 1820, a
systematic organization of equity jurisprudence developed in both England and the United States, though not all of the American states
were quick to develop a fully-formed and free standing equity jurisdic76
tion. 75 Even today, equity practices vary widely at the state level.
68
One of the most controversial and important uses of the injunction, one not centered in the first instance on a property right, was to prevent the initiation of actions in the
common-law courts and the enforcement of judgments already obtained. See MAITLAND,
supra note 10, at 257. These injunctions were intended not only to afford relief to the
parties, but also to ensure the vitality of equitable decrees as well. See id. Eventually, the

Judicature Act of 1873 abolished this use of injunctions in England, but that Act also
greatly expanded and solidified the injunctive powers of the courts of equity in other mattcrs. See id. at 257-59.
69
See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 47.
70 See HIGH, supranote 33, at 18-19 (observing that "instead of permitting the parties
to be harassed by a isultiplicity of suits," an injunction can serve to "determine the whole
matter in one action").
71

See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)

(detailing the ways in which the jurisprudence of injunctions no longer views irreparable
injury as a prerequisite to granting relief).
72 See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (D.S.D.
2002). It is important to note the difference in focus. While the goal of preventing repetitious litigation originally arose to protect the parties from unnecessary burdens, it is now
cited by courts concerned about conserving judicial resources.
73

See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 6-7 (2d ed. 1956); Aus-

TIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & SIDNEY POST SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 161-62 (3d ed. 1950). Massachusetts did not have full equity jurisdiction until 1877,

though the colonial legislative and regular courts exercised partial equity jurisdiction well
before the Revolution. Id. at 162-63.
74 See ScoTr & SIMPSON, supra note 73, at 162 ("There was no American equity jurisprudence; the English precedents were inaccessible and not well settled, and there was in
any event a hostility to all things English; many of the judges were laymen.").
75 See id. at 162-63.
76 Delaware stands as one prominent example of a state whose system of equity has
still not been fully merged into its courts of law.
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The framers of the Constitution settled the question of whatjurisdiction the federal courts would have over suits in equity. Article i1,
Section 2 of the Constitution declares that "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity." 77 The second clause of that
Section, which establishes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 78 impliedly gives the Court jurisdiction over both law and equity. 79 When the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the lower federal
80
It was
courts, it similarly granted jurisdiction over law and equity.
understood that in the state court systems that did not have separate
courts of law and equity, and likewise in the federal system, the same
81
judges would sit in both law and equity cases, but that the substantive aspects of the cases, the remedies given, and the procedures used
would be kept separate. 82 Legal and equitable procedure in the federal courts remained separate until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and equity in 1938.88
C.

The Injunction in American Law

The use of the injunction in the early history of American law was
not surprisingly similar to its use in English law. The courts established certain rules to cabin its use: the injunction should generally be
confined to protecting rights to property;84 the injunction should be
85
used only where there is no adequate remedy at law; and the injunc-

86
Furthermore, tration should be used to prevent irreparable injury.

ditionally an injunction had to state with particularity the persons to
be bound and the acts to be enjoined. 87 Because injunctions were
used to remedy ongoing violations to property rights, the scope of the
injunction was traditionally very narrow. 88 But to call those standards
"rules" belies their formlessness; as society changed, courts found that
these strictures prevented the courts from achieving equity in particu77

U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.

78

Id.
See Scorr & SIMPSON, supra note 73, at 163.
See id.
See DE FUNLAK, supra note 73, at 7.
See Sco-rr & SIMPSON, supra note 73, at 163.

79

80
81
82
83
84

See FED. R. Clv. P. 1.
See HIGH, supra note 33, at 108; Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation

and Injuries to Personality,29 HARv. L. Rav. 640, 640-41 (1916).
85 See HIGH, supra note 33, at 42-44; C. C. Langdell, A Brief Survey ofEquity Jurisdiction,
1 -ltv.L. REv. 111, 121 (1887).
See HIGH, supra note 33, at 36-38.
86
See FED. R. Crv. P. 65; HIGH, supra note 33, at 2 ("A writ of injunction may be
87
defined as a judicial process, operating in personam, and requiring the person to whom it is
directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.").
88 See HIGH, supra note 33, at 3. It is true that, in one sense, injunctions were traditionally broad in that they bound not only the parties before the court, but also any persons in privity with those parties. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
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lar cases.8 9 Thus, the chancellors would fictionalize terms in order to
bring a case within the realm of equitable remedies. 90
While change in common law often moves at glacial pace, there
are moments when legal scholars and practitioners take notice of drastic and fundamental alterations of certain substantive areas of law. In
the case of injunctions, there have been two major upheavals in American law: one during the labor movement,9" and the other during the
92
civil rights era.
The most famous of the labor injunctions came in United States v.
Debs.93 In Debs, workers employed by the Pullman Company, a manufacturer of train cars, organized a labor strike to protest certain management decisions, including a twenty percent wage reduction. 94 The
American Railway Union, led by Eugene Debs, agreed to help the
Pullman strikers by forbidding its members to operate trains that included Pullman-made cars. 95 The strike was a success, and because of
the economic importance of the rail transportation system, the effects
of the resulting "paralysis of transportation" were felt nationwide. 96
The federal government soon took steps to break the strike, including
obtaining an injunction that ordered Debs, the union members, "and
all persons combining and conspiring with them" to cease interference with the national railway system.9 7 The strikers refused to comply with the order, and the court charged Debs and other union
leaders with contempt. 98 The federal judge sentenced Debs to prison
for six months,9 9 and the Supreme Court denied Debs's petition for
habeas corpus relief.10 0
While the Supreme Court justified its decision by claiming that
such use of the injunction was "recognized from ancient time and by
indubitable authority," 0 1 a closer look at labor injunctions reveals
89 See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 47 (noting how "[m]odern issues due
to new complexities [were] smothered beneath the delusive simplicity of old terms").
90 See id. ("[TIhe chancellor brought under the concept of property whatever interests he protected.").
91
See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1 (tracing the development of the
labor injunction in American courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
92 See generally Fiss, supra note 9 (discussing the use of injunctions in civil rights

litigation).
93 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
94 See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 18.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See Debs, 64 F. at 726.
98 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 19.
99 Id.
100 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895).
10
See id. at 599. But see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supranote 1, at 20-24 (discussing the
dubious pedigree of this "indubitable authority").
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10 2
that the injunction had drifted far from its historical moorings.
Though courts traditionally used injunctions to remedy ongoing violations of property interests such as trespass, waste, and nuisance, the
federal courts began to issue injunctions against labor unions around
the end of the nineteenth century as a way of controlling labor unions
and fostering the growth of American industry. 10 3
The labor injunctions broke the traditional rules governing injunctions in several notable ways. The labor injunctions expanded the
notion of property well beyond its traditional confines.' 0 4 Also, while
injunctions traditionally were narrow remedies, the labor injunctions
were very broad in terms of the acts proscribed 0 5 and the number of
people bound.10 6 Furthermore, equitable remedies traditionally
could not be obtained where there would be adequate remedy available at law. 1 07 Nonetheless, the labor injunctions generally drew upon
the authority of criminal statutes, so that criminal prosecution could
have addressed many of the strikes. 10 8 The courts were willing to expand these injunctions beyond their historical confines because the
injunction's power, flexibility, and prospectivity made the device
uniquely suited to protect the interests of business from disruptive labor movements.
The civil rights injunction, the tool of so-called institutional reform litigation, represented an even more radical departure from the
traditional use of the injunction.' 09 The second Brown v. Board of Educationi t ° (Brown II) decision is perhaps the most famous of these injunctions. Acting upon the authority of the first Brown v. Board of
Education decision"' (Brown 1), the Supreme Court directed lower
federal courts in the districts in which the plaintiffs lived to administer

See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supranote 1, at 20-21.
See id. at 20-24. Early labor injunctions were often issued under a fictionalized
notion of nuisance, yet nuisance law "is not a very happy or adequate concept from which
to evolve law for regulating the clash of conduct in modem industrial relations." Id. at 20.
104
See id. at 47-48.
105 See d. at 89-105 (discussing labor injunctions' use of restraining clauses of "vague
102
103

and harassing significance").
106
See id. at 86-89 (providing examples, including Debs, in which courts extended the

scope of labor injunctions beyond the litigants themselves).
107 See HIGH, supra note 33, at 42-44; Langdell, supra note 85, at 121; see also HIGH,
supra note 33, at 29-33 (advocating the traditional view that courts should not grant injunctions to prevent criminal acts).
108 See Fiss, supranote 9, at 41; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 5-11, 150-98
(discussing the effect of various federal statutes upon labor injunctions, including the Interstate Commerce Act, Clayton Act, and Sherman Act).
109
See Fiss, supranote 9, at 4 (noting that civil rights issues such as school desegregation "not only gave the injunction a greater currency, [but] also presented the injunction
with new challenges, in terms of both the enormity and the kinds of tasks it was assigned").
110 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
111 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the complex, long-term process of school desegregation.11 2 This established school desegregation as one of the "prime litigative chores
of the courts in the period 1954-1974."'13 The extraordinary nature
of this task required the courts' to stretch their injunctive powers well
beyond their historical limits.
Whereas the labor injunction made at least a fictionalized attempt to fall within the traditional confines of injunction jurisprudence, 114 the civil rights injunction made no such attempt. The rights
protected were civil rights, not property rights,1 1 5 and there were no
maxims, rules, or common bits of wisdom that suggested how injunc1 16
tions might be applied to this relatively new field of jurisprudence.
This was not merely a stretching of traditional notions of the injunc117
tion, but represented an entirely new field of application.
Injunctions were uniquely suited to civil rights litigation because
they allowed for an ongoing relationship between the courts and the
institutions whose conduct the courts were regulating. 118 The injunction was thought to be an acceptable remedy when systemic problems
were so great that traditional democratic processes were no longer
adequate protections of constitutional rights. 119 Thus, civil rights injunctions were broad in scope in terms of the beneficiaries, 12 acts
mandated, 12 1 and persons bound.' 2 2 This breadth raised serious con2 3
cerns about federalism and the role of the judiciary.'
112 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (" [T] he cases are remanded to the District Courts to
take such proceedings ... as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.").
113
Fiss, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that "in these cases the typical remedy was the
injunction").
114 See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 1, at 47-48 (explaining how early labor injunctions were couched in terms of protecting the parties' property rights).
115 See Fiss, supra note 9, at 40-42 (discussing how the traditional limitation of injunctions to actions involving property rights was eroded by the development of labor and civil
rights injunctions).
116 See DE FUNIAK, supra note 73, at 4, 140-48 (discussing how injunctions may be implemented by courts to protect civil, social, and political rights).
117
See Fiss, supra note 9, at 9-12 (suggesting that, unlike the traditional "preventive"
property-based injunction, civil rights injunctions serve "structural" and "reparative"
functions).
I18 See id. at 28; Chayes, supra note 4, at 1298; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 27-28 (1979).
119 See Fiss, supra note 9, at 88-90; Chayes, supra note 4, at 1294-95 (noting that "the
fundamental conception of litigation as a mechanism for private dispute settlement is no
longer viable" in cases affecting public policy issues such as civil rights).
120 SeeFiss, supra note 9, at 14-15 ("The beneficiary of the typical civil rights injunction
is not an individual . . . rather it is a social group ....").

121 See Nagel, supra note 4, at 708 (providing examples of extremely detailed decrees
crafted by the Supreme Court based upon its interpretation of constitutional
requirements).
122 See Fiss, supra note 9, at 15-18.
123
See generally LINO A. GRACLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976) (questioning the role of the courts in the context of the
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The Administrative Injunction

The administrative injunction represents yet another fundamental change in the law of injunctions. This change has come about
slowly for a number of possible reasons. First, the slow rate of change
may be the result of the traditional incremental method of change in
the common law. Second, the administrative state itself is relatively
124
new, at least in its currently pervasive form.
It is important to note the way in which the administrative injunction differs from its predecessors. Like the labor and civil rights injunctions, the administrative injunction is not concerned primarily
with remedying property rights. 125 Unlike the labor injunction and
civil rights injunction, the administrative injunction is not broad as to
the parties bound; similar to the civil rights injunction, however, the
administrative injunction is, by definition, broad as to the beneficiary
class.' 26 Finally, in contrast to the civil rights injunction, the administrative injunction is often relatively specific as to the acts being enjoined, and there is rarely a structural, or ongoing, aspect to the
administrative injunction.
One important, if nebulous, similarity between the civil rights
and administrative injunctions is the normative role of the judiciary.127 This is perhaps the root of the controversies surrounding the
civil ights cases, particularly whether the courts properly exercised the judicial power by
imposing structural injunctions requiring integration of schools); Nagel, supranote 4 (analyzing concerns that broad injunctions by federal courts violate separation of powers pinciples and infringe upon the sovereignty of state governments). But see Fiss, supra note 9,
at 61-68 (arguing that many of the federalism concerns are misplaced); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin Institutional Litigation, 93
HARv. L. REv. 465 (1980) (arguing that many of the perceived extraordinary uses of the
injunction in the institutional litigation of the civil rights era had solid historical
precedent).
124
The seeds of concern may have been sown shortly after the New Deal began. See,
e.g., FIELD, supra note 2, at 326 (recognizing in 1935 that "[tihe battleground of judicial
review [was] already changing from the field of legislation to that of administration").
Nevertheless, courts and commentators today have yet to attempt to harmonize the obvious tones of dissonance between the judiciary and the administrative agencies.
125
The labor injunction, however, is closely linked with concepts of property, and the
administrative injunction may also implicate property rights. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998). While the issue before the
court in National Mining was the Corps' licensing policies, the underlying concerns were
closely associated with notions of nuisance or other invasions of the plaintiffs' property
rights. Id. at 1402-03. Nevertheless, the rights at issue in most administrative injunction
cases are not property rights in any traditional sense.
126
Many of the civil rights cases were brought as class actions under Rule 23(b) (2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b) (2) advisory committee's note (1966). This Note defines an "administrative injunction" as one offering class-wide benefits in the absence of a
certified class, representing an important procedural distinction between the civil rights
injunction and its administrative counterpart.
127
See Chayes, supra note 4, at 1284, 1302; Fiss, supra note 118, at 2-3.
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use of administrative injunctions and a product of the great shift in
the perceived role of the judge that took place during the civil rights
era. 128 This paradigm envisions the federal judge as the proclaimer of
the limits and normative goals of public law, 1 29 a shift from a traditional bipolar to a more polycentric and legislative view of adjudication. 130 If one believes that the court's equitable remedial powers are
inherent, then this shift in role would explain, and even validate, the
shifting role of the injunction. On the other hand, if one believes that
the court's equitable remedial powers should be constrained by historical substantive limitations, then the current use of injunctions would
represent troubling violations of important principles of constitutional separation of powers and federalism.
II
THE ADMINISTRATIVE INJUNCTION IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

Few court decisions discuss the propriety of the administrative injunction, and those that do often lack clarity. Furthermore, the cases
cited by courts to support or argue against the use of administrative
injunctions are often inapposite. This lack of clarity leads to unpredictability, which is harmful for potential plaintiffs, administrative
agencies, and the courts. There are, however, certain Supreme Court
cases that lend prudential principles to the arguments for and against
broad non-class collective relief. This Part also details the various arguments made in the lower federal courts both for and against the use
of administrative injunctions.
A.

The Supreme Court Cases

One of the cases most often cited for the proposition that administrative injunctions should not be extended to benefit nonparties is
United States v. Mendoza. 3 ' Mendoza held that nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppe" 1 2 does not apply against the government in the
federal courts.1 3 3 The Court's reasoning, if not the holding itself,
makes Mendoza an appropriate guidepost in a discussion of the scope
of injunctions. In a sense, injunctions that prospectively benefit per128
See Chayes, supra note 4, at 1284 (noting that "the trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief" in public law
litigation).
129
See Fiss, supra note 118, at 29-31 (arguing that the function of courts is to "give
meaning to our public values" and "enforce and create society-wide norms").
130
See id. at 39-44 (criticizing the view of scholars, such as Lon Fuller, that courts
could not competently perform "polycentric" tasks).
131
464 U.S. 154 (1984).
132
See id. at 159 n.4 ("Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks
to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated
unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party." (emphasis added)).
133
See id. at 162.
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sons not parties to the original action function in the same way as
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. The essential reason for the
decision in Mendoza was that the federal government does not have
the same interest or stake in a suit as does a private litigant; 3 4 the
Court thus reasoned that foreclosing the use of nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel against the government would "better allow thorough development of legal doctrine by allowing litigation in multiple
forums."1 35 In particular, the Court found that allowing such use of
estoppel would "substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue"' 3 6 and-would deny the. Supreme Court the benefit
of having the chance to review the decisions of several courts of
appeals.137
The opinion in Mendoza was essentially a policy argument for limiting the equitable discretion of the courts in a particular situation.
The decision said nothing of the power of the courts, and it reinforced
the legitimacy of applying nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
when the litigants are private parties.' 18 Thus, in applying these policy arguments to the use of injunctions, courts should be asking
whether the arguments apply with the same force. The lower courts
often recite these policy reasons without distinguishing either between the facts of their cases and the facts of Mendoza or between the
nature of collateral estoppel and the nature of injunctions.
Califano v. Yamasaki139 is another Supreme Court decision often
cited for the proposition that an injunction "should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief
to the plaintiffs."140 For several reasons, however, it is misleading to
rely upon Califano in discussing the appropriate scope of an adminis14 1
trative injunction. First, Califano was brought as a class action.
134
See id. at 159 (explaining that the government is different from a private litigant
"both because of the geographic breadth of Government litigation and also, most importandy, because of the nature of the issues the Government litigates"). Another reason
implicit in the decision, though not given voice by the Court, is that the use of nonmutual
collateral estoppel will, over time, put the government at a serious probabilistic disadvantage. See, e.g., Note, A ProbabilisticAnalysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of CollateralEstoppe, 76
Micti. L. REv. 612 (1978) (using probability theory to discuss and reject the abandonment
of mutuality of estoppel).
135 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 163.
136 Id. at 160.
137
Id.
138
See id. at 159.
139
442 U.S. 682 (1979).
140
Id. at 702.
141
Id. at 688, 689. One class consisted of social security recipients residing in Hawaii
whose benefits were subject to adjustment without notice or hearing; the district court had
also certified a nationwide class of individuals whose benefits could be adjusted without
notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 689. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the two
cases on appeal. Id. at 690.

1136

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1119

Thus, its discussion of the feasibility of class-wide injunctive relief essentially turned on the propriety of the district court's certification of
the class in the first instance. 142 The Court found that the district
court had properly certified the class under Rule 23(b) (2)143 and that
nothing in the Rule limited the geographical scope of such a decision. 144 The Court thus held that the scope of injunctive relief was
properly "dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by
1 45
the geographical extent of the plaintiff class."
Several of the unsuccessful arguments in Califanoagainst allowing
nationwide class relief anticipate the government's arguments in Mendoza against the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. That
is, a decision in the first instance could "foreclose [ ] reasoned consideration of the same issues" in other circuits. 146 Also, the government
claimed that allowing nationwide classes puts undue pressure on the
dockets "by endowing with national importance issues that, if adjudicated in a narrower context, might not require [the Court's] immedi147
ate attention."
There are, however, several important distinctions between the
issues presented in Califano and in Mendoza. First, because Califano
was brought as a class action, an adverse decision would bind the entire class; in terms of collateral estoppel, the preclusion would be mutual. In Mendoza, on the other hand, a decision adverse to a single
plaintiff would not bind future plaintiffs, yet the government would
always be at risk of an adverse decision with preclusive effects in future
actions involving nonparties.
Second, the Califano Court relied on the various protections inherent in the class certification procedure to protect against judicial
usurpation. The Court held that class-wide relief is entirely appropriate where "[tihe issues involved are common to the class as a
whole"1 48 and "turn on questions of law applicable in the same man142

Id. at 698-704.

Id. at 700-01 (finding that "[tihe issues involved are common to the class as a
whole" and that "the class-action device saves the resources of both the courts and the
parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every social security beneficiary to be
litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23").
144
Id. at 702.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 701-02.
147
Id. at 702. This same argument was expressed in the Mendoza decision. See United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984). In Mendoza, the concern focused not upon
the potential burden to the courts' dockets, but upon the executive's ability to choose
which cases it would appeal. That is, allowing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral
against the government would essentially force the government to appeal every adverse
decision for fear of preclusive effect in future enforcement actions. See supranotes 135-37
and accompanying text.
148
Califano, 442 U.S. at 701.
143
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ner to each member of the class." 149 Having found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, 150 the Califano
Court found that nothing logically or legally foreclosed injunctive relief for the entire class of plaintiffs. 15 1 Thus, the propriety of relief was
very much tied to whether the initial class certification had been valid.
A third case that makes its way into this debate is Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation.152 In particular, those who wish to justify the use of
injunctions that benefit similarly situated nonparties point to Justice
Blackmun's dissent. 15 3 A portion of the dissent discusses the appropriate scope of relief when a court strikes down an administrative action. 5 4 In particular, Blackmun contended that, when a court strikes
down a "generally lawful" agency action as it is applied to one particular party in one particular instance, relief should be confined to that
party. 155 In other instances, where an administrative program of general application must be struck down, injunctive relief may properly
benefit persons not parties to the action. 156 In those instances,
broader relief will be justified by the "programmatic" nature of the
57
claim. 1
Several important distinctions should be noted between Lujan
and the current administrative injunction cases. First, one of the important issues in the administrative injunction cases is that the lower
federal courts are issuing these sweeping orders. Of course, many of
the problems arising from the issuance of administrative injunctions
are obviated when the Supreme Court strikes down an administrative
action. In that situation, the scope of the precedential force of the
149

Id.

150

Id. at 706.

See id. at 705-06.
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
153
Id. at 912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is, of course, dictum for precedential
purposes, but at least one federal judge feels that Blackmun is speaking for the entire
Court as to this particular point. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, it does appear from the Lujan opinion that the points raised by Blackmun may be
settled as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.
154
See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 913. One of the debates taking place in Lujan is over the
precise contours of "agency action." Although the specifics of the debate go beyond the
boundaries of this Note, some idea of the term's meaning is essential to any understanding
of the appropriate scope of relief. In Lujan, the majority of the Court suggested that there
is a threshold of coherence that a party challenging the agency action must clear in obtainingjudicial review. See id. at 890 (finding that the land withdrawal "program" administered by the Department of the Interior was too formless to constitute an "agency action"
for the purposes ofjudicial review). Once that threshold is cleared, relief should be tailored to the sweep of the agency action, allowing specific relief for specific violations and
programmatic relief for systemic wrongdoing. See id, at 894 (advocating a case-by-case approach to relief).
155
See id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156
See id.
157 See i&.
151

152
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decision and the scope of the injunction are congruent, and concerns
of preserving an administrative agency's prerogative of intercircuit
nonacquiescence fall away. Second, the Lujan dissent does not stand
for the proposition that class-wide injunctive relief is appropriate
whenever an agency program is struck down. Blackmun merely says
that the existence of incidental nonparty beneficiaries when an
agency program is struck down does not render relief overbroad.' 5 8
Thus, the dissent does not argue that broad relief must be given when
an agency action is struck down, but that broad relief may be given
when an agency program is invalidated.1 59 Third, the dissent addresses neither the use of injunctions in general, nor whether classwide injunctive relief is appropriate in the absence of a certified class
of plaintiffs.
Although none of these three oft-cited cases is directly on point,
each introduces various prudential concerns that the courts of first
instance should consider in setting the scope of injunctive relief.
Califano suggests that the courts should apply a narrowing presump160
If
tion when determining the scope of administrative injunctions.
the court is willing to consider the propriety of class-wide relief when
there is a certified class of plaintiffs, then surely a court should consider whether such relief is appropriate in the absence of a certified
class. Califano also suggests that in cases in which a class has been
certified, a reviewing court should give deference to the district
court's decision to offer broader relief. 6 1 Mendoza suggests that
courts employing broad remedies (estoppel or injunctions) should be
aware of the national policy concerns of both the judicial and executive branches.162 The lower courts should consider whether the judicial system would benefit from litigation of an issue in multiple
circuits. 163 If so, class-wide relief may not be appropriate. Likewise,
the executive could benefit from a policy changing incrementally over
time, without the risk of national policy being suddenly altered by a
single adverse district court decision. 164 While the Lujan dissent suggests that broad programmatic relief may be available and appropriate, it cautions courts to assess the extent of the agency action and the
nature of the right being protected in fashioning the appropriate relief.165 Taken together, these cases acknowledge the availability of
See id.
See id. This point was part of a much larger debate about the contours of "administrative action" in determining the availability of judicial review.
160 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1979).
161
See id. at 705.
162 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1984).
163 See id.
164 See id. at 160.
165 See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
158
159
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broad relief but caution that it should be as narrow as is feasible while
affording the plaintiff full relief. These decisions also suggest that certain policy factors extending beyond the instant case should be
considered.
The Lower Courts

B.

A number of cases in the lower federal courts have discussed the
appropriate scope of administrative injunctions. These cases argue
both for and against these injunctions, but, unfortunately, most of
these cases argue their positions stridently and without properly differentiating between the case at hand and the precedent they cite.
This section of the Note analyzes a group of representative cases, divided generally into those advocating for the granting of class-wide
relief in the absence of a certified class action and those advocating
for narrower relief restricted to the parties before the court. These
cases can be further divided into subgroups based on the nature of
the rights asserted, who is bound by the injunction, and the type of
relief requested. Despite this attempt at classification, the reader
should be warned that the courts follow no coherent analytical format
in assessing the appropriate scope of relief, and many of the arguments on either side are the same. Thus, the purpose of this section is
to illuminate the arguments both for and against broad relief.
1.

Cases Allowing Broad Relief

As an initial matter, when granting broad relief, courts generally
begin by stating that "there is no general requirement that an injunction affect only the parties in the suit."'1 66 This has always been true of
the court's equity powers. Rule 65 explicitly recognizes that an injunction may bind those in privity with parties before the court,1 67 and the
modem history of the injunction countenances numerous instances
in which an injunction's beneficiaries have reached far beyond the
parties to the suit. 168 There are, of course, limits on that broad power,
and the courts have been counseled to exercise discretion in granting
166
See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Evans v. Harnett
County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982), and Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1981)). It is interesting that the Bresgal court offered these two decisions to support this proposition because (1) they are from different
circuits, (2) they are both Title VII employment discrimination cases, and (3) they are both
cases in which federal courts considered enjoining a state agency and a private company.

167
168

See FED. R. Cirv. P. 65(d).

The civil rights era produced many instances where injunctions affected nonparties
to an action. If one acknowledges that at least some of these injunctions were proper, then
one must accept the general principle that courts have the power to grant such relief. See
supra notes 114-17, 120-22 and accompanying text.
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such relief 1 6 9 Their opinions tend to offer little in the way of principled policy arguments as to why broad relief is or is not appropriate in
a given situation. The courts do tend to focus on three main concerns, however, when determining whether or not broad relief is appropriate in a given case.
First, the courts often repeat the prudential concern that classwide or nationwide relief should be no "'more burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties. ' " 7 0 This argument, of
course, means little without some notion of what complete relief to
the parties entails or what kind of relief is more or less burdensome
than another. Also, while this seems to be a narrowing principle, the
courts that grant broad relief tend to focus more on the "redress" as171
pect than the "no more burdensome" aspect.
Second, the courts often stress that class-wide relief will eliminate
the need for repetitive litigation concerning a particular agency action, yet this argument seems to cut both ways. On one hand, preven172
tion of duplicative litigation is a legitimate concern of the courts.
An agency's choice to pursue policies in one circuit that have been
deemed unconstitutional in another circuit invites the affected parties
to sue over issues that have already been litigated, consuming large
amounts of scarce judicial and administrative resources.1 73 On the
other hand, the prerogative of agency intercircuit nonacquiescence is
169
See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (noting that "it has long been
held that an injunction is 'to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case'" (quoting Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 33 (1850))).
170
See Bresgal 843 F.2d at 1170 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702-03
(1979)). Citing Califano for this proposition is misleading, however, both because Califano
was brought as a class action with a certified nationwide class and because it is a Supreme
Court case. Thus, the fact that Califano has intercircuit binding effect is the result of res
judicata and stare decisis, not of the injunction itself. That is, once the district court properly certified the class, the decision bound all the parties in that class anywhere in the
country. In addition, because it is a decision of the highest court, the precedential effect is
nationwide. Thus, even if Califano did not grant class-wide relief, it is hard to imagine that
an administrative agency would choose to apply the same law to any similarly situated person in contradiction of Supreme Court opinion. Even if the agency were not bound as to
that individual by the previous judgment, the agency would be showing remarkably bad
faith by forging ahead with the knowledge that the federal courts would be bound to follow
Supreme Court precedent when an enforcement action would inevitably be brought.
171
Cf Profl Ass'n of Coll. Educators v. El Paso County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 730 F.2d 258,
273-74 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that an injunction that extends protection to persons who
are not parties is not overbroad "if such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the
relief to which they are entitled").
172
In fact, prevention of repetitious litigation has historically been justification for the
use of injunctions, though the original concern was one of convenience for the parties, not
the courts. See supra note 72.
173
See Bresgal,843 F.2d at 1170 ("To shop in a number of court of appeals in hopes of
securing favorable decisions is not only wasteful of overtaxed appellate resources but dissipates agency energies as well." (quoting Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 912
& n.1 (3d Cir. 1981))).
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an important prudential consideration, and that principle is often
cited as a reason for limiting the scope of relief.' 74 When the courts
do cite authority to show that narrow relief would potentially invite
unnecessary agency nonacquiescence, the cases tend to be from a series of federal decisions in which state agencies or private individuals
175
have been enjoined in employment discrimination actions.
Third, the courts often argue that limiting relief to the parties
before the court will create administrative difficulties. 176 That concern, however, is probably best confided to the agency's discretion. If
the agency cannot maintain the program while observing a narrower
injunctive order, then the agency has the option to voluntarily suspend its program. Although there may be no practical difference in
outcomes, there is a prudential difference that should be acknowledged by the courts. As the Ninth Circuit held in a case narrowing the
district court's injunction, "[tlhe burden is on the [agency] to comply; as a practical(but not legal) matter, the [agency] may have to end
its challenged practices entirely to avoid the possibility of violating the
177
injunction and being sanctioned for contempt."
Taken together, these concerns suggest a solution that ties in with
the dissent in Lujan. If a plaintiff successfully challenges a rule of
"broad applicability," then the relief, the invalidation of the rule, will
naturally extend to persons beyond the named plaintiffs. 178 Thus, in
cases where an administrative regulation has been held unlawful, the
"ordinary result is that the rules are vacated-not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed."' 1 79 This principle may
apply beyond rules of broad applicability, and a better formulation
might be that the appropriate relief is only discernible in light of the
goals that the court (and the litigants) hope to achieve. If the goal of
174 Cf. id. at 1169-70 (recognizing that "agencies have sometimes been allowed to confine a ruling by one court of appeals to that circuit, and continue to enforce their own
interpretation of the law elsewhere").
175
E.g., id. at 1169-71. It is misleading, however, to cite these decisions for the proposition that prevention of duplicative litigation is a legitimate goal. The parties bound in
these cases were not federal agencies, but rather private companies or state agencies with
no legitimate prerogative of intercircuit nonacquiescence. Also, in order to find discrimination, the courts must first find systemic wrongdoing. In such situations, broad relief is
not only appropriate, but also necessary to remedy the harm.
176
E.g., Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983).
177
Zrpeda, 753 F.2d at 729 n.1.
See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
178
dissenting).
179
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Quoting Harmon is somewhat misleading in this instance, since that court was concerned not
about narrowing the relief generally, but about narrowing the relief in a way that avoided
suggesting judicial rewriting of agency regulations. See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 495 n.20.
Thus, the court was concerned not with intruding into the business of other circuits, but
with regulating the functions of the agency.
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the court is, for example, an end to segregation in public transportation, 18 0 it will be impossible to issue an injunction that confines relief
to the parties before the court.' 81 Narrow relief, in that situation,
would not be calculated to achieve the desired goal.'8 2 This is why we
find many examples of necessarily broad injunctions in the civil rights
context. In other contexts, the goal of the litigation will not demand
such broad relief. For example, if the court wishes to enjoin the government from entering into a certain contract because of illegal bidding practices, 8 3 the injunction is properly limited to the parties
18 4
protesting the contract in question.
2.

Cases Arguing Against Broad Relief

The cases arguing against broad relief tend to sound in the high
tones ofjudicial restraint, 85 expressing fears ofjudicial usurpation. 8 6
In general, however, the arguments invoked against broad relief bear
a striking resemblance to those advanced in support of broad relief.
In many instances, the cases and basic principles cited on both sides of
the debate are exactly the same. This highlights one problem that has
been lurking throughout this discussion: The principles cited by the
courts tend to be vague, and their decisions generally avoid stating
outright the various concerns that shape these propositions into a specific decree.
Courts arguing for narrower relief tend to begin by reciting
Califano's proposition that injunctions "should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to
the plaintiffs."' 87 Again, this is an important consideration, but on its
own it proves nothing, and cases arguing for broad relief cite the same
180
See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963) ("Appellants do not
seek the right to use those parts of segregated facilities that have been set aside for use by
'whites only.' They seek the right to use facilities which have been desegregated ....
).
181 See id. at 206-07 (reasoning that if the challenged segregation policies were
deemed unconstitutional, the scope of relief could not be limited to the plaintiffs alone).
182
This is, of course, not the place for a discussion of whether or not such a goal is
proper. That is well-trodden territory. See generally Fiss, supra note 9 (praising the development of the use of injunctions in civil rights litigation); GRAGUA, supra note 123 (criticizing
the use of injunctions in school desegregation).
183 See, e.g., Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986)
(modifying the district court's injunction as overly broad).
184 See id. at 890 ("While it was within the constitutional power of the court to grant
broader relief,jurisprudence governing injunctive remedies will not permit it.").
185 See, e.g., Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that a federal
court "may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court").
186 See, e.g., Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 263 F.3d 379, 394
(4th Cir. 2001) ("We would in effect be imposing our view of the law on all the other
circuits." (citing Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 1988))).
187 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
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proposition."' The courts arguing for narrow relief seem to emphasize the words "no broader than necessary," while the courts arguing
for broad relief tend to focus on the phrase "complete relief to the
plaintiffs."18 9 The two phrases taken together, as they should be, suggest a balancing of interests. 190 The cases that have cited this proposition, however, have rarely undertaken an explicit balancing of
interests.
In addition, courts granting narrower relief often cite Mendoza's
argument that allowing one circuit to determine the law of other circuits will "substantially thwart the development of important questions
of law," 191 depriving the Supreme Court of the benefit of more than
one instance of appellate review.19 2 The underlying principle here is
the agency prerogative of intercircuit nonacquiescence-the "well-setfled principle in the federal court system that decisions in one circuit
are not binding on district courts in another circuit."19 3 Of course,
this presents a problem in cases involving a properly certified nationwide class, where the Supreme Court has held that nationwide relief is
proper.194 Thus, the question becomes whether there is a practical
difference between a proper class action with a nationwide class and
an injunction that specifies nationwide relief to the parties and similarly situated nonparties alike. The answer is that there are important
differences, none of which are dispositive, but all of which should be
considered by a court before issuing broad relief against federal
195
agencies.
Many of the cases arguing for narrower relief tend to offer only
the most conclusory reasons for denying class-wide relief. For instance, in the oft-cited National Centerfor ImmigrantsRights, Inc. v. Immi188 See, e.g., Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170 (citing Califanoyet arguing for broad relief); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963) (granting broad injunctive relief that
extended to all similarly situated persons).
Compare Bresgal 843 F.2d at 1170 (citing Califano, and then noting that "there is no
189
bar against class-wide, and nationwide relief in federal district or circuit court when it is

appropriate"), with Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 728 (citing Califano, and yet noting that "injunctive
relief should be normatively tailored to remedy the specific harms shown by plaintiffs").
190 In Califano, for instance, the Court carefully analyzed the competing interests
before arriving at the conclusion that class-wide relief was appropriate.

See 442 U.S. at

698-703.
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). For cases citing this proposi191
tion, see, for example, Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc., 263 F.3d at 393, and Right to Life
of Dutchess County, Inc. v. Fed. Election Commission, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
192
See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
193 Right to Life ofDutchess County, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (citing United States v. Glaser,
14 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1994)).
194 See Califano, 442 U.S. at 701-03. The Califanocourt explained: "Nor is a nationwide
class inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of

the plaintiff class." Id. at 702.
195 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the importance of the class action device.
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gration and NaturalizationService' 9 6 (NCIR), the court denied class-wide
relief, stating merely: "The INS asserts that in the absence of class certification, the preliminary injunction may properly cover only the
named plaintiffs. We agree." 197 The court provided no argument of
its own to support this statement, and the three cases cited by the
court to support this proposition were inapposite. The first cited
case1 98 involved a preliminary injunction 99 against a local school
board, not a federal agency, 200 in which the individual plaintiff's claim
was moot.20 ' The second cited case 20 2 involved an action in which the
federal district court had failed to specify a class and the injunction
was held to have failed to remedy the plaintiffs' harm. 20 3 The third
cited case 20 4 involved a preliminary injunction prohibiting one private
company from suing another.20 5 This is not to say that the result in
NCIR is wrong; these distinctions are merely given to illustrate the
problem in this area. The problem is that the courts, in fashioning
appropriate relief, tend to offer what seem to be merely felt conclusions in reaching a result. Often, the cases cited to support a particular holding could also be read to counsel a contrary conclusion.
Thus, the arguments for and against the administrative injunction tend to be more conclusory than informative. After the shift in
the use of injunctions during the civil rights era, it is hard to argue
that the courts do not have the power to issue such broad injunctions.
Thus, the debate turns to the various prudential concerns that courts
should consider when issuing such an injunction. Unfortunately, currently there seems to exist no conceptual framework within which we
might be able to evaluate the relative importance of the various prudential concerns in the individual case.
III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE INJUNCTION IN

THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

CASE: TOWARD A COHERENT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This Part attempts to isolate a number of factors that seem to be
at play in these decisions, some of which are routinely mentioned and
196
197

text).

743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1371 (citing three decisions, discussed infranotes 198-205 and accompanying

Hollon v. Mathis Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
For a discussion about the importance of the type of injunction implemented, see
infta Part III.A
200
For a discussion of the differences between federal and state and local agencies for
the purposes of equity jurisprudential debates, see infra Part III.A.
201
Hollon, 491 F.2d at 93.
202
Davis v.Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974).
203
Id. at 1366, 1370.
204 Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971).
205
Id. at 818-19.
198
199
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some that are never mentioned. In particular, this Part identifies nine
factors (eight factual situations and one procedural concern) that
should be considered by a court when assessing the appropriate scope
of an injunction against a federal agency. Hopefully, by bringing
these factors to light and putting them into a coherent framework, it
will be easier to see the ways in which these factors can be systematically considered when granting the appropriate relief.
A.

Eight Factual Concerns

The first factor that should concern the courts is the type of party
involved in a particular case. Courts should distinguish between injunctions against federal agencies and injunctions against state and
local agencies and private parties. For example, injunctions against
state agencies raise federalism concerns, 20 6 as well as abstention issues,207 that are not present when the defendant is a federal agency.
Courts wishing to grant narrower relief commonly cite cases in which
federal courts have declined to issue class-wide relief against a state
agency, even when the injunctions in the cited cases were narrowed
solely for reasons of federal-state relations. 20 8 Contrariwise, the
agency prerogative of intercircuit nonacquiescence, a consideration
that is a commonly cited reason for narrowing relief, is not a concern
when a federal circuit court enjoins a state agency on a class-wide
level. When the issue of a nationwide policy is removed from the
equation (as is generally the case when a federal court is enjoining a
state agency), the argument for broadening the injunction becomes
much easier. Despite this, courts arguing for broad injunctive relief
often cite cases involving state agencies and thus do not consider the
federal agency prerogative of intercircuit nonacquiescence. 20 9
The second consideration is that, when enjoining a government
agency, courts should apply a narrowing presumption. The history of
See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
206
500 (1974); see also Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Rizzo for the proposition that there must be a "showing of an intentional and pervasive pattern of misconduct" on the part of state officials before a court will enjoin a state
agency).
207
See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) (noting that "a federal
court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an
ongoing state [investigation]"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (explaining that
federal courts should generally abstain from enjoining state court proceedings).
208
See, e.g., Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing, among many
other cases, Doran, a decision based largely upon the doctrine of federal court abstention
and having little to do with the propriety of class-wide relief in the absence of a certified
class).
209
See, e.g., Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving an injunction against a federal agency yet supporting its argument by citing cases in which the defendant was either a state agency or a private party); see supra notes 174-75 and accompanying
text.
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equity in general, and injunctions in particular, suggests that these
remedies are strong medicine, and should only be prescribed as necessary to achieve just results. 210 As discussed in connection with Mendoza, 2 11 narrower relief is important in preserving the agency's
prerogative of intercircuit nonacquiescence, but such a consideration
is not always dispositive. 212 Almost every recent federal court case discussing the appropriate scope of an injunction cites Califano for the
proposition that injunctions should be narrowed as much as possible,
2 13
taking into account the extent of the injury to be remedied.
A third factor to consider is whether the challenge to the agency
rule or action is facial or as-applied. The arguments of the Lujan dissent should come into play only when the court has struck down an
agency regulation or an entire administrative program. Otherwise,
countervailing considerations, such as the narrowing presumption,
might counsel against broad relief when the injury lies in unlawful
application of an agency regulation. 2 14 Cases arguing for broad relief,
where the challenge is to a rule as-applied, often cite decisions in
which the challenge was facial. This consideration also ties in with the
Califano proposition that the courts should be clear on the purpose of
2 15
the injunction when setting its scope.
The fourth consideration that courts should take into account is
the nature of the right being vindicated. First Amendment claims
should not be treated in the same way as due process claims. Civil
rights cases involve different remedial considerations than tax disputes. This ties in again with the scope of injury consideration. Some
substantive legal areas may warrant broad relief, even where the
party's individual injury might be remedied by a narrower injunction.
210
See MAITLACND, supra note 10, at 254-60 (tracing the development of the injunction
in the English Court of Chancery). But see Fiss, supra note 9, at 1-6 (suggesting that injunctions should no longer be at the bottom of the remedial hierarchy).
211
See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
212
See, e.g., Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 651 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Continued caseby-case litigation of the Commonwealth's attempts to collect filing fees from indigent candidates will not serve the interests of the candidates, the Commonwealth, or its voters.").
213 Almost every case discussing the administrative injunction cites this narrowing "presumption." See, e.g.,John Doe #1 v. Veneman, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 2004); Sharpe v.
Cureton, 391 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003).
214
See, e.g., Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).
Citing Califano's narrowing presumption, the Meinhold court limited the scope of relief by
ordering the plaintiffs reinstatement into the military, while declining to enjoin the Department of Defense from enforcing similar regulations against other military personnel.
Id.
215
See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963). The Bailey court was
clear that it was offering broad relief because the remedial goals were broad, stating that
"[t]he very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate requires that the decree run to
the benefit not only of appellants but also for all persons similarly situated." Id.; see also
text accompanying notes 155-56 (discussing Lujan's approach to tailoring the proper
scope of relief).
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For instance, many First Amendment cases are concerned with the
chilling effect of government-imposed speech regulations. 2 16 When a
court strikes down a regulation on First Amendment grounds, classwide prospective relief may be especially appropriate in protecting the
free speech rights of persons not before the court. Class-wide injunctions are often an important part of civil rights litigation, both for
institutional reform and for cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act. 21 7 Due to the particularity of the underlying substantive law, such
cases should not be cited for the general proposition that class-wide
relief is appropriate in the absence of a certified class.
The fifth concern is the type of injunction at issue: the order may
be mandatory or prohibitory, and its duration varies depending upon
whether it is a permanent injunction, preliminary injunction, or temporary restraining order. Each type of injunction presents different
issues that the court must consider in setting the appropriate scope of
relief. Preliminary injunctions, for example, are generally issued
upon an incomplete presentation of evidence and before the court
has fully considered the merits of the case;2 1 8 their function is to preserve the status quo.2 19 Thus, preliminary injunctions should be presumptively narrower (i.e., less burdensome to the defendant) than
permanent injunctions granted after a full hearing and decision on
the merits. 220 Some courts have argued that preliminary injunctions
should be subject to less scrutiny because of the temporary and emergent nature of such relief.2 21 This contention, however, confuses reviewing the scope of the injunction and reviewing the propriety of such
216

See

FIELD,

supra note 2, at 324 (

Freedom to speak when there is the will to speak is worth more than later
assurances that the freedom to speak is constitutionally guaranteed and the
enforced silence an error. The will and time to speak having passed, the
value of the right, both to the individual and to society, has been reduced
greatly.
There are also prior restraint concerns where injunctions have the effect of chilling
speech. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing that injunctions affecting intellectual
property rights implicate the prior restraint doctrine); Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected
History of the PriorRestraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the FirstAmendment and the
Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L. REv. 295, 330-32 (2001) (discussing injunctions barring
labor-related expression in the early twentieth century).
217
For a discussion of the importance of class-wide injunctions to civil rights litigation,
see generally Fiss, supranote 9. Sometimes, of course, narrow relief is appropriate in civil
rights cases. See, e.g., Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1480.
218
See STORv, supra note 30, at 367-68.
219
See id. at 367.
220
See id.
221
See, e.g., Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 512-16 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Orrick, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should have granted a preliminary injunction by applying a less rigorous standard than that required for a permanent injunction).
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relief in the first place. 2 2 2 Because it is easier, as an evidentiary matter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, courts should conduct a more
searching inquiry into the appropriate scope of such an order. Thus,
on appeal, the review of the grant of the preliminary injunction
should be more limited, while the review of the scope of the relief
should be more searching. Finally, prohibitory injunctions are generally less intrusive than mandatory injunctions; courts should also be
aware of this distinction when reviewing the propriety and scope of
such injunctions.
A sixth factor is the type of agency or agency action the litigants
are challenging. The courts tend to show a high degree of deference
to law enforcement agencies, and this deference seems to influence
the courts' decisions to narrow the scope of injunctions that might
otherwise be acceptable.2 23 When courts cite these cases in later decisions that do not involve injunctions against law enforcement agencies, they must give due regard to the different factual background.
As is the case with law enforcement agencies, courts often given a high
degree of deference to the decisions of prison administrators. Although the Supreme Court has held that "[p] rison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution, ' 224 the courts have sanctioned certain restrictions on inmates'
conduct that are acceptable only in the corrections context.225 Many
cases exhibiting similar deference involve the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as immigration law implicates many sensitive issues
which may affect a court's decision in setting the appropriate scope of
relief.
A seventh factor, venue restrictions, is more obscure but equally
important. Because organic statutes often confine review of agency
action to particular venues, a court must consider the impact an injunction might have on its own docket. For instance, in NationalMining Ass'n v. US. Army Corps of Engineers,22 6 the D.C. Circuit Court
approved class-wide relief in the absence of a class action. The court
222
SeeZepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that review of preliminary injunctions is "much more limited" than the review afforded to permanent injunctions, but failing to distinguish between reviewing the propriety of the injunction and
reviewing its scope).
22-1
See, e.g., Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273-74 (6th Cir. 2003); Thomas, 978 F.2d
at 509. But see Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815 (1974) ("Where, as here, there is a
persistent pattern of police misconduct, injunctive relief is appropriate.").
224
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
225
See, e.g., Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099-100 (6th Cir. 1994) (analyzing
how prisoners' ability to communicate with those on the "outside" may be constitutionally
regulated); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990) (discussing, inter
alia, the deference that courts should afford to prison administrators when reviewing policy decisions).
226
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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expressed fear that a narrower ruling would generate a flood of duplicative litigation because venue rules would force many would-be plaintiffs to seek review in the D.C. Circuit Court.227 The court conceded
that "[t]he resulting gap in the effective scope of the nonacquiescence
doctrine appears to be no more than an inevitable consequence of the
venue rules in combination with the APA's command that rules
'found to be ... in excess of statutory jurisdiction' shall be not only
'h[e]ld unlawful' but 'set aside."' 22 8 Thus, a court's consideration of
the scope of review of an agency action may legitimately inform the
scope of an injunction.
The eighth factual concern is that a court should distinguish, in
arguing for narrower relief, the type of narrowing to be done. In
some instances, tailoring the injunction to remedy a specific statutory
defect will result in a court essentially rewriting a regulation.2 29 In
such cases, broader relief invalidating an entire regulation will force
revision by the agency itself, thus avoiding judicial legislation. 230 In
other situations, narrowing relief to remedy a specific harm will not
cause the court to rewrite a regulation; in such instances, narrower
relief may be more appropriate.
B.

One Important Procedural Consideration

As the ninth and final consideration, courts should consider the
boundaries of the class of potentially affected nonparties. Court opinions contending that class-wide relief should be unavailable in the absence of a certified class have improperly relied upon cases where
class certification was denied.2 3 1 While the denial of class certification
itself suggests that class-wide relief is inappropriate in that particular
case, it does not mean that class-wide relief is inappropriate in any
case absent a certified class. In some cases, a class may be readily ascertainable and of relatively static membership. In other situations,
the class may be so broad, diverse, and numerous that class-wide injunctive relief approaches legislative action. In any situation, the
court should consider the difficulty in ascertaining the extent of the
class and potential nonparty effects, much as a court would do in certifying a class. If, for example, the class of potential beneficiaries would
be relatively small or easily defined, and if the members before the
Id. at 1409-10.
Id. at 1410 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)).
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting the
229
See, e.g.,
"fundamental principle that agency policy is to be made ... by the agency itself-not by
courts").
See id. at 495-96.
230
See, e.g., Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.1 (1964) (citing cases).
231
227

228
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court would adequately represent them, then certification of a class
232
may not be as important.
Surprisingly, some courts seem to overlook, or explicitly disregard, the many procedural safeguards in the class certification process. 2 33 However, when a court decides whether class-wide relief is
appropriate in the absence of a certified class, these procedural and
practical matters should be taken into account. Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the class action, contains provisions that are important to both party defendants and to potentially
affected nonparties as well. 234 Under the Rule, the court is required
to ensure that class representatives will adequately represent absent
members' interests, 2 35 and the Rule provides the court with broad
236
powers to issue orders protecting the class members.
Furthermore, courts in administrative injunction cases often overlook the benefit of repose to the defendant in a class action. Party
plaintiffs and absent class members alike are bound with respect to a
defendant in a class action. Thus, because class actions tend to involve greater downside potential than non-class actions, a defendant
can, and generally will, commit greater resources to defending a class
action lawsuit. Where there is no formal class action, yet there is the
potential for class-wide injunctive relief, the defendant must defend
the action with the resources that would be dedicated to defending a
class action, yet the winning defendant does not benefit from the res
judicata effect on nonparty class members. Even if the plaintiffs in a
non-class action achieve class-wide injunctive relief, the potential nonparty beneficiaries are free to sue on the same grounds for different
relief.
Aside from these safeguards inherent in the class action, other
procedural incidents deserve mention. For instance, discovery in a
class action is much broader than in non-class actions. 237 In the case
See, e.g., Bangertv. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643, 650 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that "[t]he
232
plaintiffs before the [clourt are sufficiently representative of the class").
233
See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[l]nsofar as the
relief sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state
officials on the ground of unconstitutionality of a statute or administrative practice is the
archetype of one where class action designation is largely a formality, at least for the plaintiffs."). But see Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 633 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972) ("And
we can not hold, as the amici urge, that Rule 23 is a meaningless formality which this court
should disregard.").
234
See FED. R. Cxv. P. 23.
See, e.g., FEn. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(4), (e). There are no notice requirements for class
235
actions brought under Rule 23(b) (2), the provision allowing for class-wide injunctions. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
236
See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(d); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972) ("The
judge is invested with both obligations and a wide specgenius of Rule 23 is that the trial
trum of means to meet those obligations.").
237
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (laying out federal procedure for class actions).
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of administrative injunctions, where class-wide relief is available in the
absence of a certified class, the defendant may be unable to obtain
discovery from nonparties who stand to benefit from a win by a party
plaintiff. Furthermore, the practical concern of enforcement remains. When the plaintiff wins class-wide relief in a non-class action,
who has the right to bring an enforcement proceeding if the defendant disobeys the injunction as to a benefited nonparty? Must the
party plaintiff bring the enforcement proceeding? May a nonparty
beneficiary bring the enforcement proceeding? Could either person
bring such an action? Thus, it is clear that the class action designation
is no mere formality. The courts need to move from a binary approach to a more sensitive analysis of how the class certification procedure may allow more fair and manageable relief for the parties and
potentially affected nonparties.
In some sense, underlying the arguments for and against broad
relief in these specific cases are the court's own views on the nature
and function of the judge's inherent remedial powers. 238 As the regulatory state increasingly saturates private activities, the need for courts
to draw lines between public law and private rights becomes
23 9
evident.
CONCLUSION

This Note does not purport to offer a blanket rule for or against
administrative injunctions. In some situations, nationwide and classwide relief seems clearly appropriate, and it is now beyond question
that federal courts have the power to issue such decrees. In other
situations, however, policy development is best left to the competence
of the administrative agency. Some courts have given a nod to these
concerns, yet most generally fail to address the propriety of administrative injunctions in a coherent fashion. In sorting out the guiding
principles, this Note has attempted to show that a framework of considerations may be imposed upon this messy business. A more systematic approach to this extraordinary relief would no doubt increase
administrative and judicial efficiency by providing potential litigants
with clearer expectations regarding public law litigation in the federal
courts.

238
For a discussion of the remedial powers ofjudges, see Fiss, supra note 118; Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudicatio, 92 HAv. L. REv. 353 (1978);John Choon Yoo,
Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot ? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL.
L, Rav. 1121 (1996).
239
See generally FIELD, supra note 2 (examining the effects of unconstitutional statutes
and advocating for greater judicial review of such statutes). Interestingly, Field published
his book in 1935, see id. at iv, on the heels of the New Deal. His analysis seems to be
cautiously awate of the burgeoning regulatory state.
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